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Animal Genetics and Behavior

Is  vestibular neurobiology a route to the development of sociality in Turtles?

How social are turtles anyway? Is the vestibular system a unique organ for an independent evolution of testudinidae social infrastructure?  Is there more cooperation or competition in the expression of inter individual interactions? What is all that pushing about?


The notion of sociality in animals and that of individuality in plants (or variation within a given plant) is not a particularly homogenous topic. Last evening (March 15, 2014) E.O. Wilson presented his group selection view from eusociality in an overarching presentation that included humans which attempted just that.  By describing eusociality as the " highest" form of social organization etc. it appears to me that regardless of the mathemematics that goes to support a prior group level trait observation,  that the forms of  trends in evolveable social organizations that can be instructed in the Wilson way is  very limited manner on his approach.  It will result in  further endless bio-mathematical disputes rather than  a simple empirical decision based set of judgements.  Thus I criticize it not with philosophical or moral reasonings but simply because I can imagine sociality trends in salamanders, frogs, and turtles in ways that are broader narratively than Wilson attempts and  applies to us - humans. No genetically higher formating than some other instructability for inter vs intra demic differences is needed when discussing if a trait is group level thing or a difference between individuals. In particular whether a particular social trend later is able to lead to eusocilaity or whether such a higher"form" is needed for dominance say in terms of biomass is ambiguous and does depend on its face rather more on the kinds and diversity of social trends than a particular genetic runaway scenario. Thus I argue from the grammetology of evolution of humans not the lexicology which is horribly even more complex. Thus my view is yet another reason that Dawkins should have agreed with Roughgarden.  I had thought that DS Wilson was correct when I sat around a table with him in the mid 80s and that Gould was  wrong.  But Roughgarden provided a way to imagine a huge diversity of social organization that did not need to be necessarily associated with sexual selection.  Wilson's view is vestige of the somatic programmability from within a Fisherian type body of an organism and will always have to have a less broad view of the genetic DNA instantiations of sex relative to social behaviors.  Attmempts by mathematicians like Alger and Nowak to seperate preference from others is simply too narrow a theoretical space that was opened much farther by Roughgarden. Despite the larger group selection ADDITION of theoretical placings that Wilson's view provides Rougharden's is MULTIPLICATIVELY larger. Again, these mathematical arguments only make the matter (social selection in many senses) worse not better.  Human beings may be "conflicted" and remain  in limbo suspended in the middle but there is no reason to habilize this to turtles and salamanders let alone to frogs and toads. Mult-level additivtiy has a place but not exclusivity contra inclusive fitness.  Social selection Orthogenesis (Croizat,Wright, Grehan)(orthoselection into orthogenesis) may function somatically across what was added selectively by Wislon Nowak and others.  That was the biolgical intuition/concept  (not purely mathematical)I was using. Orthoselection across levels of selection if based on orthogenesis and not seperate group level phenotypic trait claimed observations (Gould etc) is another way to get the same connection of trackable data points (math fun ction law linking them). Nowak is not thinking from the biology first.  Wilson was. I do not see any way to intuit multi-level selection if multiple levels of organization remain undefined.  In the aggregation of tissues to organs evolutionarily the phenotype acquires shape through form-making.

To imagine a particular eusocial dinosaourid phenotype is infinitely more speculative than my attempts to use acual infinity in form-making (below and elsewhere on this website).  It requires that one bypass directly Wright's idea of the relation of pressures on mendelian populations where an organ does or does not diminish in size to zero.  In Wright's time this simply manifested as whether  recessiveness might simply be due to biochemical inactivation.  When any force function an organ may impart is a hierarchical suparmolecular organization levels above the direct selective force target it is necessary to a prior levels of organization justified before math is applied to the difference of the substance of the classification and forces of the same.  That is simple bio-philosophy (different than physics philosophy  etc) but Wilson's allows mathematicians to get around this by a pontentially falsifiable use of game theory.  Sure science in not by conducted by polls but I do not want to wait another2 decades before eusociality is shown mathematically impresise as Wilson now does for sociobiology's inclusive fitness simply because a missperception compounded off a poor sense of herpetological form-making.

Did you know turtles make sounds? Tortoise sounds during mating have been known for quite a while, but within the past few years more recordings of turtle sounds have been documented. 


Seven different forms of sound communication (distinct call types) have recently been described for Chelodina oblonga and just this year, 2013, evidence for posthatching parental care in Podocnemis expansa has been suggested as an interpretation of sound (chirps?) produced by hatchlings still in the egg. Water turtles of the family Emydidae vibrate their foreclaws onto the shells of conspecifics loudly enough that it can be recorded easily outside the tank in which they reside (personal observation).

The complicated repertoire of sound production in Chelodina functions in part it has been reported at least to locate prey.  The turtles will saccade their heads to help “echo-locate” prey.  This is not the same kind of echolocation known in bats.  It appears that the turtles may be using the difference in the gibal system of the vestibular canals simply as head motion differences in time. Can this basic physiological capacity to use sound and head motion be used in the social evolution of all turtles?  Young turtles interact with others. Could the continual interaction lead to social selection for these behaviors in such a way that it increases the number of offspring that make it into the next generation??


Traditionally head motion and sound production (for instance in the tortoises) have been thought to be serve different functions.  Head bobbing has been proposed as a means of competition while vocalization as a biological reproductive isolating mechanism.  The “inner ear” however processes both head motion and sound reception together further up in the brain and it is possible that both  modalities may serve the same ethology.


In 1973 and 74 Maynard Smith and Price suggested that some behaviors are evolutionarily stable because when anyothers are “played” upagainst them  the alternatives are not as successful in the outcome of the interaction.  They described the wrestling of snakes without fangs, the bending down to lock horns in quadrupeds and turning the other belly in ruminants as scenario of limited war combatant behavior in which the use of more dangerous techniques of interaction are avoided since they would be  less successful since they damage the whole. This perspective has been applied to the head bobbing and shell pushing in tortoises.

But is this true. Is the correct interpretation of the motion in these complex social behaviors?


The shapes of the inner ear semicircular canals is variable in turtles.  These shapes have been used to suggest locomoter environments of prehistoric turtle ancestors.  Is locomotion a (ecological orientation) concussion kinematics prior to independent evolution of behavior differences underlying changes in social infrastructure? The vestibular system is a critical control component in the locomotion of vertebrates. The morphogenesis of these structures affect the response time, signal gain and frequency range of the system.



Sound can be represented as actually infinite numbers of different frieze patterns layered in 3d Euclidean space.  The ear hears by probing with 3 actually infinite points (associated with the Quaternionic axes as in the point at infinity in complex number plane) by using the belt-trick to untwist the sound’s rotations. 

This ability can be modeled with pairs of fundamental series (one end indicating amplitude and the other frequency) and the reverse used to point at any given rotation in any given density (magnitude of transfinites in the soundscape).  Ordertypes thus span any reflections between the translations (convergence of the series) and rotations (3 points at infinity slicing rotations between *w and w).


5)              Evolution of  the ear.

The received opinion (and via awarding of the Nobel Prize) on the way the ear works is via a travelling wave created by the drum towards the hair cells (eddy currents of Von Beskey). This is a n outside – in  view of its efficient causation and thus implies that any ultimate selective effect is through selection for changes in the production of the eddy currents and/or the hair cellss to respond to particular current/frequencies. 


This physiological proposal finds its consequences worked out in th e current view on Anuran audition evolution in whch a reductionsit signal – reciever of the frequencies has been propounded such that it leads to the idea of bandwidht segreation in evolution. ( Ryan etc, Evolutionary Biology of the Anurans 1973 Schoitz Ecolotical Aspects)Straughan (Bioacousitcal Aspects)


Ralph Abraham (Vibrations and the Realization of Form 1985) suggested that the ear may operate as transparent elastic macron subject to an unknown combinatorial algebra rather than via a frequency resonance of eddy simmering current macrons as currently received.


Here we expand on Abraham's suggestion and show that not only is an possible understanding of frog audition enhanced ( how fast adaptiablity to sound – noise envinronments vs local dialects) but this different hypothesis makes understanding the evolution of the fis ear (to cold and warm bloods) more comprehesivible and integrabel with other senses (lateral line, electroperception). We further modify Abrahma's holonomic brain model via  computer modeling of the ear macron system.


It has recently been shown that frogs can alter their calls based on the noise in the background and that females will orient preferentially to theese context specific calls.  The flexibility of the aunuran system that permits this is suggested to be at odds with bandwidth seperating idea of local dialects selectively mainatined in populations.  Here we show how view of the ear as a natural macroscope provides a simple way explain the plasticity and also suggeste that turtel foreclaw behavior changes a point ear macron in to a circle attractor. 


The basic thesis is that the ear is  a quaternionic  rotation free point attractor macron that can be  put into state of inertial motion relative to that rest point by concussive body locomotion or general displacement of the organism and that sound waves further modfiy this attractor as a superimposed ossicillation.  This complex macron thus is decomposed into three parts that all combine through a common neuronal processing to create the sense of sound and orientation. Thus the ear is not simply a frequency encoded brain neurophysiology that is also organized with head motion and body position but rather there are some neurons that respond directly to the whole macron itself.  Thus the Hubbel Wiesel eye idea for the ear is also mistaken on this hypothesis.


With this new hypothesis one might actually be able to imagine a functionality for the evolution of extant amphibians that posses pedicelliate teeth.  It may be that by leaving the lateral line buoyancy relation to the ear behind only frogs, salamanders and ceacilians survived the move to land as they developed teeth that channeled the motion of prey relative to the head so as to cause and use a reflex of the catastrophe control surface to snap the mouth shut when the prey was in about to get out of the mouth.  This enabled amphibians to eat smaller things since they could retain a higher number per snap and later evolved tongues to assist in the snapping. Macron algebra might be used to explain the phylogenetic variance in  salamander teeth patterns relative to the muscle forces in the fore-legs.


The hypothesis of macron relations to quaternionic algebra may be used to explore the differences in the ears of birds vs mammals vs frogs vs fish as well.

Cantor had differentiated the point at infinity of complex analysis with his newly proposed series of actually infinite numbers.  Here we show how the ear’s morphological physiology operates with a materiality that connects both the points and the numbers substaintially.   The expanse of the infinitely small to the infinitely large (of “potential” infinity) is Metaphysically contained within these layers by Kant under various “Starken”

or intensities of differently classified Linnean and moving force classes.  It remains a need in science to have a classification of moving forces so that the infinite points can be enumerated into the layers per actually transfinite sets of freize patterns. Biology has not helped matters by thinking that forms can only not operate where teleology may have been thought.  Thus Kant’s infinite in the Opus Postuum is largerly about the 3 point infinites connected to any transfinite infinite and not to Cantor’s transfinite infinite itself.  Wesizacker mistook and confused the application of Cantor’s infinite into quatum mechanics thus by mistaking Aristotle’s and Cantor’s infinite.  The quantum mechanical application of the actual infinite does need a particular transfinite but it is not the transfinities themselves (Russell attempt etc) but the ordertypes that bind a particular physical structure to the Euclidian space in  which the object (on the large scale exists).  It is possible that the model for the ear may help to develop ideas about space and time (with respect to mass) but I leaver that for another thought. The quantum mechanical use of number-classes depends on complete relation of potential infinities not on sensory modality specific projections.

The presentation of frequency and amplitude (waveform) in terms of back to back fundamental series (reversed and rotatable) shows what Cantor means by indicating that the infinitely small if they were real (they appear not when biology and physics is combined through chemistry) are different than the becoming infinitely small.  As the belt-trick twists around a fundamental series pair the 3 points at infinity are crossed bodily as the relation between the frequency and amplitude becomes both infinitely small (frequency) and infinitely large (amplitude). (written Sept 3 2012 Brad McFall).  The general history that discusses Cantor’s rejection of the infinitely small as real is mistaken and recent attempts to show that they are indeed objects crosses the phenotype – genotype difference without regard. Robinson did not understand the difference between phylogeny  (trees) and genotype (path analysis  -Wright) and thus combines both cause and correlation if used for anything other than math. This is a legacy of Russell’s mistaken physical application of series of infinites generally started but not set within Kant’s pure physiology between moving force classifications and classified Linnean systems. There are new ways to understand the parallels of geometry through sense not simply apperceived that takes evolution into account.  Poincare did not do this.  We can. Russell simply only took one possibility not an infinite number of them.  So while we did not need  or want metaphysical control when coming up with some/any physical idea of the actually infinite applicable to matter in combination through chemistry of biology  (Robinson’s mistake  on infintesmal) and physics (Weisaker mistake on QM) it is need when evolutionary kinematics are dynamically combined to produce individual steps through transfinites over evolutionary time (dfferent forms formed). The difference of a transient meaning and a transient purpose were not understood by modern biologists and Mayr made this impossible to accord with the Darwinian tradition. As we develop DNA computer interfaces to tissue, enginner the ecosystem with applied evolution and travel and life off earth this will be enabled.  Then perhaps the metaphyiscs will reappear as more and more transfinites are liked to different real not logical use of the 3 points (not one) at infinity compassed.


What is the origin of that information (1-D symmetries in force impacting space creating sounds and pressures and waves) and the development of canals to separate double quaternions into single quaterions (lateral lines from lancelets to morphologically made torus quaterions. With recapituatlions.)

. It is possible to discuss explanatory and descriptive teleonomy within social selection. Teleonomic description depends on just what 1-D symmetries are in the environments past and present of the teleonomy so being explained.  These symmetries may arise as by products of the behavior computer as somatic program recapitulated, through teleomatic necessities, or due to otherwise adapted features. The evolutionary tier is not preprogrammed but historical and depends on many things other than just the behavior computers churning while changing. This churning and changing is in this case followable as the entropy measure of the teleonomic program from juvenile to adult behavior as the different quaternionic monomial become determinant for “the entropy” as the belt-trick is algorthmitized out of various homogneous polynomial functions of differing degress.

The proximate reward sensation is the efficient cause of the ultimate acquisition of the trait. The proximate causes (quantum mechanical 4pie rotations in chemical bonds) mirroring this ultimate social selection have yet to be identified but are likely to be parts of the mechancanical electrical transduction means in the hair cells.

This trait may contain a double quaternion use where individual threat points are operative asymmetrically thus providing a purely computational interval to friably separate material teamworks regardless of the physical waveforms (depending on how pleasure is neurobiologically instaintiated in turtles). Social selection thus can provide a kind of dynamics that is not reducible to the optimization framework suggested for universal biological dynamics.An optimization framework of biological dynamical systems Ryota Horie Transcendetals categorize the countably infinite recovered in the social selection evo tier but remain logically within a superset of the non-countably infintly divisible sound types.The difference between Williams and Mayr’ use of Pittenridgh depend on how infinity is found in the analysis. This places anti-Gould heterochornic space inbetween any velocities (accelerations retardations) and thus make a heterogenous set of polynomials but restricted in dynamics they can record given past recapitulations.

Teleonomy Apropos: What is a goal of turtle ear organization?

Ernst Mayr has made what he considers a factually based case that Gould’s attempt to explain the mechanistic relationship between ontogeny and phylogeny via heterchorony is incomplete. (1994)  He describes somatic programs as recapitulations and challenges molecular biologists to find the ultimate why of his reasoning and explain how it is that some ontogenetic developments require somatic programs and others do not. These somatic programs were described as a “behavior computer” in 1961.

Though some attempts to bring this idea forward have appeared (Digitial ontogeny/phylogeny; Measure of Teleonomic entropy) many comments have be negative (Hulswit, Ariew,Francis,Thompson).

I will show how social selection sensu Roughgarden is (dynamically)kinematically poised to differentiate the goal-directed processes implicated by the somatic program as behavior computers in the evolutionary tier by unconfounding the proximate reward sensation molecular biology from the behavioral equilibrium determining specific social infrastructures selected as adapted features by a direct application/instatiation/manifestation of the information metaphor Mayr introduced regardless of the teleomatic forces that the attraction and repulsion of the chemical bonds used/involved necessitate.

Thompson thinks that Pittenridgh’s idea that biologists who said, “The turtle came ashore and laid its eggs rather than the turtle came ashore to lay its eggs” meant to differentiate a description of an organization from an explanation of an organization. And that Mayr fails to do this.  Mayr does say that proximate causes are purposive to the extent that computer programs are but that natural selection never is.  Thus it will be possible to say that proximate reward sensation of turtles is TO have the most number of offsring and is done by the goal of either dipsplaying to the horizontal or the anterior posterior canals but because the molecular chemical bonds that that operatie the program that does the goal direction may be many different kinds (4pie rotations in the dual electrical mechanical continuum)Plural the ultimate somatic program retained reacapitualtionally is not to be a particular adaptive feature even though particular adapted features do arise as particular chemical attractions and repulsions are historically accumulated.  Thus Huxley’s random small order variation that is converted by the operation of selection into directional large-order variation – evolutionary change along lines adapted to the improved performance of biological functions in a given enviornmenht does exist in turtle organization.  Because there can be different molecular materials that control the quaternionic monomial constants during the attainment of specifc goal directed ends these ends nevertheless never are causally responsible for the current operation which is socially selected nevertheless.  Social selection through specific somatic programs can be understood to fully unconfound the physiological mechanism from the evolutionary change.


Hulswit wrote, “Mayr fails to explain what he means by ‘causal.’ I can only interpret him as follows: a program is an efficient cause, which in combination with other efficient causes (the internal and external disturbances), completely determines the end state of the process or behavior.  If so, then Mayr owes us an explanation of how under different circumstances, and thus, given different sets of efficient causes, the same program may lead processes to the same general end state.”

The behavioral tier equilibriums generally do this.

“More importantly: how can programs be considered as efficient causes at all? Or put more concisely: is there a theory of efficient causation that meets with the idea of a program?  That seems unlikely, for efficient causes are singular events or facts, while programs are not.”  The different ways that the belt-trick can be employed topologically/algebraically and with what particular quantum mechanical rotations provide, a rich field for meeting this requirement is extant.  The singular quantum mechanical rotations may be in different chemicals but the 1-D freize pattern rotations are general for the particular interpretation of sound-vestibular functionality suggested here. There is also a possibility of using transfinite numbers of the patterns in the continuum (electrical-mechanical) should a better understanding of the relation of the telenomy and teleomatics was known.

Social Selection : Nature’s Social Security System

Roosevelt inaugurated social security as a means to help socially secure stability for people who may wonder how long a job will last and how to pay to remain cared for when older.  Does nature posses such a system?  Can society learn from living things how to better secure an abundant and prosperous future? Let’s get a sense of social selection and find out!

Optimal Foraging Theory shewed that creatures indeed make decisions about energy and food and Joan Roughgarden and her lab have suggested that living things posses the same kind of intelligence when it comes to survival of offspring.  Given the notion of natural selection as causal in the process of changing forms over space in time it not only makes some sense that life able to jointly (as opposed to individually as in foragaing theory) raise more offspring in the succeeding generation will evolve to do so but moreover,  the technology transfer of economic thinking into evolutionary stability provides powerful tools to uncounfound  immediate physiological particulars from general genetic historicity in some cases.

There have been challenges that natural selection as reproduction of the more fit is circular and in this decision evolving process it undoubtly is. The range of hypothesis space in which some directions over others occur however widens as particular decisions are no longer immanent but became contingent. Biological evolution is not cosmic evolution in any sense. This makes social evolution via social selection sensu Roughgarden into a completely different trajectory than that followed even by many interpretations of Neo-Darwinism including the ultra-modern move to incorporate an evolutionary biology of multiple levels of selection. Social selection occurs with garden variety individual natural selection albeit technically it may be thought as modeled on two or three tiers (Individual behavioral – evolutionarily stable (mutation dependent) – and population genetic (deme –species relations).  Showing all of these differences is daunting but we will consider some of the ramifications at the end of this work.


In foraging theory a lizard may be shown to have a manipulatable cut off distance (the length to which it will go to attack insects while patrolling for a meal) and that some kind of cognitive decision is performed by them in not going as far if there are many insects around.  Birds have been shown to have the ability to hide seeds for the next year just as mammals.

This ability to optimize/equilibrate/minimize behavior to maximize energy or efficiency or productivity could be something that males and females or parents do to maximize the probability of survival of their offspring. 

Roughgarden et al has incorporated ideas and solution concepts from economic theory into evolutionary game theory to provide an end that these means could fulfill.  The kinematics of its operation is however at slight clinamatic perverted deviance from that being considered standard or regular for motions of evolutionary proportion especially when it comes to individually based ideas of of sexual selection regardless of the genes involved. This may be due largely to a failure to recognize that removal of a binary sexual difference need not imply hybrids of some kind or type only but rather renders a an ordinal trend instead.  But since social selection purports to secure a path for sociality evolution and the phenomenon of sexualization it proceeds beyond the simple gene reductionist position as the physiology of it’s axiomatic bases currently  overdetermined becomes better known and generalized to particular lineages.  Despite appearances it may even be that a power of motion in plants can  once again be considered equivalent to cognition at least on the cosmic (solar system) scale – but that remains for the sequel.



Can Conway names be applied to convergent flame spectra series to generate a "next" and" preivious" spectrrm (in the naming sequences?) Does Conway naming  of element spectra permit an association of flame spectra series across the periodic table and built up from Hydrogen as was proposed years ago?  Is this used by biological creatures differently (across generations) than in pure chemical reactions? Does the ordinality in life enable different naming associations than is possible in wet chemistry of the dish?  Do these have biophysical properties purely defined out of the periodic table (QM)? Are they a part of supramolecular chemistry?  Does the Gladyshev law of macrothermodynamics apply in the social selection of these (bottom up)directions?

Rather than being described by omega squared. (as pictured above)  the biological distances between molecular bindings of the flame spectra type may possibly be variably connoted in arbitrary object denotations of w x *w (Omega times Omega reversed) arithmetizations.  This would permit a classification of moving forces that support taxonomic naming practices.

Unlike the use of infinity as expressed in the work being developed under Yaroslav Sergeyev's directum

I do try to say WHAT an infinite object is.

It seems to me we can go farther and attach object oriented programming to the arbitrary objects of Fine on top of the infinity computer as we NAME the objects between the taxonomy and biogeography that is evolutionarily stable yet behaviorally dynamic.  There is a clear difference of math and philosophy in Kant's Opus Postuum that is being played out as grossone computations interface with biological items. The confusion between arbitrary (random) infinity and actual objects that reflect infinite properties is not necessary in evolutionary theory as it is physics because there are differences between the variable species and the variable gene that are biophysically constant (or infinite) and unconfounded.

“the sets {1, 2, ...} and {1, 2, ..., } are the same.”

'Elliot Mendelson remarked in his review of Sergeyev’s book [1] that “the systems he deals with consist of objects which are called extended real numbers, but the descriptions of these objects and their properties are not clear enough to permit any warranted judgments about the assertions made by the author about these systems.”'

Could the goal directedness of a behavior computer work by replacing the behavioral dynamics (infinitesmals) after a memory time (somatic program histogenic threshold) with GrossOne working both back to behavior and forward to ESS evolution (transfinites) and thus make these descriptions clear and nameable with a Conway name?  Can we make these objects clearer by using GrossOne to bridge between behaviors empirically confirmed and the social selection of these suggested compatible with ESS (infintesmal to a larger GrossOne radix in the somatic program that computes the ESS from the social evolution of the component coalitions in a whole actual population)?”  Thus as more behaviors become understood as social evolutions socially selected one will have an increased memory infinite computer that contains evolutionary past contingent options passed in particular lineages. The computers operation will simulate the actual evolutionary past.  This may need to go through a combinatorial game overlapping the difference of the NCE and NBS.

"In fact, the role of this would-be mysterious entity can happily be performed by the factorial of an arbitrary infinite number which are galore in nonstandard analysis"

Let this be an arbitrary (random (dispersal drift evolutionarily)) Fine object of cantor ordinal ontologically yet computable nonetheless in a population genetic POPULATION and divide the distribution into ordertypes of behaviors socially selected.  Thus the Wright population structure will decide which arbitrary number was used and thus what kind of randomness was past in the contingent gene fixated passed time.  Doing this prevents a prior determination of the exact neurological details of mutual regard and pleasure gradient climbing based team work. It allows a choice of where the intended agency is to begin and even allows plants to be subject to social evolution.

The idea that there may be a need for an external sense schema categorically for substance, which is the material aspect used by Kant’s ether (Hall) arises in the possibility that bodily empty spaces can be compressed by supposed silicon based life form. Nasa doubted this possible.  But if so, nevertheless, we would not and do not know how senses may be configured and especially how the brain would “nerve” to the senses if silicon replaced carbon down to the repulsion for any given attraction of gravity common to silicon and carbon (not to say anything about the different gravities silicons and carbons may have been exposed to).  Thus Substance is only a “backdrop” insofar as the gravity that may have affected silicon or carbon or some other elemental based life form in its attractions worked with  attractions (or not) of  the “genetic” code of some kind of elemental life form.  Now if the ether is understood as Mendelev himself thought of it it might be possible to sustain Kant’s view but it would not be interpretable under our post-Bohr understanding of the atom but once again if the distances between energy levels be infinite fundamental series from Hydrogen on and this space better described under all repulsions and attractions where different probabilities of life forms gened with different base elements (carbon, silicon,sulfur, boron) etc then it would but then one would have found the “universal” substance cosmically rather than the cosmic life subject to elemental forces which is what we actually have today.   Thus whether empirically enduring  substances can be the only use of the category of Substance belies the fact that the infinity of the path diagram of the inheritance of silicon life as opposed to carbon life may be different only in ordertype or form and thus endure as a lexicology of the living grammer deconstructed.  So an external space scheme would come from our minds as we discover and invent such.  It would be internal to any life but infinite.  Thus appears the problem.

Perspectives in Ethology: Volume 11 Behavioral Design

“Discussion: R. Dawkins (1976) provides convincing reasons against regarding natural selection itself as a cybernetic feed back mechanism.  Serveral  authors, however, have suggested applying cybernetic notions to individual organisms (Beckner 1969;Mayr 1974;Boorse 1976; Adams 1979).  Mayr (1974) differes from most biophilosophers by focusing on the notion of goal-directedness rather than function as his main teleological concern. He admits that there is heuristic value in, as he puts it, “the teleological Fragestellung” (Mayr 1974/1988 p.60).  He claims, however, that a system is genuinely goal-directed only when it is controlled by a “program,” and he prefers Pittendrigh’s label teleonomic for such systems.”

One difference here to notice is that a correlation of variables back to itself through a circuit of others is not necessarily a cybernetic feedback in the strict sense and yet could be programmed into a computer.  The algorthrims that form such a circle of relationships can have nothing to do with the causal processes except being a form or shape of some aspect of the causality.  Mayr had roundly miss-understood in the Fragestellung the difference of final and efficient causes since it is certainly possible for man to simulate behavior of creatures with computer programs and models.  Social selection sensu Roughgarden is an attempt to do for social infrastructure foundation what optimal foraging theory did for/in behavioral ecology. Optimal foraging theory clearly creates optimized trajectories which are then asserted to be what is causal for the correlations observed. So it is not a criticism against Mayr for using these kinds of behavior computer circuits equilibrated onto a particular shape (“cybernetic feedback”) for natural selection or evolution of (in the example given) of social evolution.  It could only be claimed in this issue or inquiry if the underlying genetics (of the behavior phenontypes) is rather not arising by natural selection but by immigration, mutation, drift etc and what are the differences in the individual gene frequency distributions vs the population gene frequency distributions. This is really just a criticism of Mayr’s lack of involution inNeodarwinism into development .  He chose to redirect the notion of recapitulation in its stead.